General René Schneider was the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army in 1970, and he held a position that should not have been remarkable but turned out to be lethal: the army's job was to defend Chile's constitution, not to decide its elections. When Salvador Allende won the presidency and powerful people in Santiago and Washington wanted the army to stop him from taking office, Schneider said no. Not because he was a socialist — he wasn't — but because it wasn't the army's call to make. They killed him for it.
Chile in 1970 had one of the most stable constitutional traditions in Latin America, and Schneider was its embodiment inside the military. His position, known since as the Schneider Doctrine, was simple: the armed forces exist to defend the constitution and the law, and a military that overrides an election because it dislikes the winner has stopped being an army and become a gang. When Allende won a plurality in the September 1970 election and the decision moved to Chile's congress, Schneider stated publicly that the army would respect the constitutional process regardless of outcome.
That made him the single largest obstacle to the people — Chilean and American — who wanted Allende stopped before inauguration day. President Nixon had ordered the CIA to prevent Allende from taking power, in a directive that explicitly contemplated a coup. Declassified U.S. government documents, examined in detail by the Senate's Church Committee in 1975, established that the CIA worked with Chilean military plotters, and that weapons and money moved toward officers planning to remove the constitutionalist obstacle — Schneider — so a coup could proceed. The plan was to kidnap him and blame the left, creating the chaos a military intervention could ride in on.
On October 22, 1970, plotters ambushed Schneider's car in Santiago. He drew his sidearm to resist the kidnapping and was shot. He died of his wounds three days later — two days before the congressional vote that confirmed Allende's presidency, which proceeded exactly as Schneider had said it should. The immediate effect of his assassination was the opposite of its intent: Chile rallied around the constitutional process in revulsion, and the army held its line for three more years.
The Church Committee found that the CIA had supplied submachine guns and funds to Chilean plotters during the anti-Schneider operations, while noting the weapons used in the fatal attack itself appear to have come from a different faction than the one the CIA armed directly — a distinction that matters for precision and not at all for responsibility, since the CIA was knowingly funding and encouraging the kidnapping plot that killed him. Schneider's sons later sued Henry Kissinger and the U.S. government; the case was dismissed on the grounds that these were political questions beyond the courts' reach. Nobody in Washington was ever held accountable.
Three years later, the coup Schneider stood in front of finally came — September 11, 1973, Pinochet, the bombing of the presidential palace, seventeen years of dictatorship, thousands dead and disappeared. Every one of those years is a measure of what Schneider had been holding back, and what it cost to remove the one general who believed the army answered to the constitution instead of to whoever was angriest about an election.
He was asked to overthrow his own country's election and said it wasn't his job. It got him killed — and it took them three more years to find enough generals without his spine.
The army exists to defend the constitution — the principle is still taught as the Schneider Doctrine, named for the man who died rather than break it.
This week's international badass was the last general standing between Chile and a coup — and Washington helped arm the men who removed him for doing his job.
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